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ABSTRACT
This thesis explains how the government of British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to accept the 
deployment of American nuclear-armed cruise missiles on 
British soil without any physical means of preventing them 
from being launched. The missiles were accepted in the face 
of massive public opposition to them and particularly to 
the absence of a physical means of control known as the 
"dual-key" system.
Chapter one defines the "special relationship" between 
the UK and the USA, arguing that the relationship grew up 
mainly during World War Two and was elaborated upon after 
that. Chapter two narrates the history of Anglo-American 
defence relations, concentrating on the presence of 
American nuclear weapons and delivery systems stationed in 
the UK and the agreements concerning control over their 
use. Chapter three tells how and why the NATO allies agreed 
to the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe. Chapter 
four explains why the stationing of cruise in the UK 
aroused intense public opposition and examines what British 
and American officials and politicians thought the 
agreement over the control of cruise actually meant. The 
British maintained that the agreement constituted a veto 
over their launch? some Americans either denied or refused 
to affirm this.
The conclusion is that the USA and the UK have arrived 
at a quid pro quo. The USA provides the UK with strategic 
delivery systems so that the UK can maintain a nuclear 
force under its own control. The UK provides the USA with 
bases for American forces and American nuclear weapons; 
these bases are essentially under American control.
WHO CONTROLLED CRUISE?
THE 1983 DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE POST-1945 ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP IN DEFENCE
INTRODUCTION
Fall 1983 marked the beginning of the installation of 
464 American-owned, ground-launched cruise missiles in 
bases in Europe. They had been requested by the European 
members of NATO. The Europeans feared that the strategic 
parity in nuclear weapons between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, the recent Soviet superiority in theater 
nuclear weapons and the possibility of a SALT III that 
would include theater nuclear missiles would all combine to 
limit theater systems in a manner disadvantageous to the 
security of Western Europe. Specifically, they were afraid 
that Western Europe would be decoupled from American 
nuclear forces and would lack the strength in theater 
systems to counter the Soviets * corresponding systems.
Thus, the agreement with the United States to provide 
nuclear-tipped, theater-range cruise missiles had 
originally been hailed by Western European governments as a 
sign of Atlantic solidarity in the face of a mounting 
Soviet threat.
Amongst the European publics, however, there was 
anything but such unanimous approval. In Great Britain, two 
criticisms were made of the arrangements to provide cruise.
2
3One was that any increase in any nuclear weapons in any 
place, at any time, for any reason was to be deplored. Such 
criticism came from the disarmament movement, specifically 
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and many members of 
the Labor party, in the House of Commons and in the party 
as a whole. The other, much more widely voiced criticism of 
the arrangements for cruise concerned not the ownership by 
Britain of nuclear weapons nor the presence on British soil 
of American nuclear weapons, but the means by which the 
launching of the wholly American-owned missiles might be 
allowed or prohibited by the British government. The 
criticism centered on the Thatcher government's refusal to 
purchase the so-called "dual key" control system for 
cruise. Dual key referred to a system used on the only 
other previous occasion when the Americans had agreed with 
the British to place missiles not wholly under British 
control on British territory. The weapon in question had 
been the Thor intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), 
in service in Britain between 1959 and 1963. The dual key 
control system meant that the missiles had been bought by 
the British, the warheads were owned by the Americans and 
the launching of each whole weapon depended on permission 
being given by both one American and one British officer by 
means of two keys, one in the possession of each officer. 
This gave both the American and the British governments an 
effective veto on the launching of Thor. Now that a
4comparable weapon was being installed, there was strong 
feeling amongst the public and members of Parliament of all 
the parties in favor of a new form of the dual-key system. 
Yet the Thatcher government successfully resisted the 
considerable political pressure generated by this feeling, 
insisting that there was a "special relationship" between 
the United States and Britain, that this had given a 
context for relying on written and verbal assurances by the 
Americans that they would not launch any nuclear delivery 
system from British territory without the agreement of the 
British government and that these assurances were an 
adequate safeguard. This thesis will discuss why the 
Thatcher government was willing to trust to this special 
relationship in a matter of the most vital national 
interest.
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first 
defines the special relationship. The second traces the 
history of the Anglo-American relationship in matters of 
nuclear energy and weapons, with a particular emphasis on 
nuclear weapons delivery systems based on British territory 
and the inter-governmental agreements about them. The third 
discusses the issue of who controlled cruise. The fourth 
draws conclusions about the refusal of the Thatcher 
government to have a dual-key control for cruise and its 
implications for the special relationship.
5There are two terms which need some clarification 
regarding their use here. The terms "cruise” and "cruise 
missile" I shall use to refer to the ground-launched cruise 
missile, 160 of which were located at the Greenham Common 
and Molesworth air bases in Great Britain. In fact, there 
have been and are a great variety of missiles which share 
the same characteristics of being low-flying and 
air-breathing, beginning with the German V-l, and these 
will be referred to by names other than the terms "cruise" 
or "cruise missile." The term "dual key" will be used to 
refer to the arrangement whereby the warhead would be owned 
by the United States and the missile by Great Britain. For 
cruise, unlike the control system for the Thor missile, 
there would not necessarily be any actual keys. In other 
words, the term "dual key" has the merit of conceptual 
clarity, since it makes comprehensible popular concern 
about whether the British government could physically 
prevent the launching of American cruise missiles from 
British territory. For the reasons of common usage and 
conceptual clarity, I will retain the term.
CHAPTER I
THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP DEFINED
The most comprehensive definition I have found of the 
term "the special relationship" as it pertains to the 
subject of this thesis has been given by John Baylis, a 
British professor in international politics, in the preface 
to his 1984 book, Anglo-American Defense Relations 
1939-1984. For this reason I will use it as the basis of my 
own definition, adding remarks of my own and by others as 
necessary.
For many writers, one crucial feature of the special 
relationship has been that, as Baylis notes, "the 
particularly close nature of the alliance stems essentially 
from sentimental attachments, cultural affinities, 
historical traditions, similar institutions and a common 
language." He cites Sir Dennis Brogan, author of American 
Aspects, observing that "the linguistic and cultural 
relationship between England and America is not paralleled 
in any other pair of relationships" and quotes the argument 
of political science professor Arthur Campbell Turner that, 
"the foundation of the special relationship between Britain 
and the United States is demographic, the basic fact is
6
7that to a considerable extent the population of the United 
States derives from British sources." 1
A second feature has been the convergence of strategic 
interests. The two nations have been concerned with 
protecting themselves (and to a lesser extent other 
nations) against the expansionism of both the Axis powers 
during the Second World War, and the USSR after 1945. 
Although there have inevitably been differences in 
interests between the UK and the USA, these have never 
attained sufficient importance for a sufficiently long 
period to offset the convergence of strategic interests.
A third feature has been the manner of the 
relationship's conduct. Henry Kissinger's detailed 
description of this manner, as set down in White House 
Years, is well worth quoting at length:
...the special relationship with Britain was peculiarly 
impervious to abstract theories. It did not depend on 
formal arrangements? it derived in part from the memory of 
Britain's heroic wartime effort; it reflected the common 
language and culture of two sister peoples. It owed no 
little to the superb self-discipline by which Britain had 
succeeded in maintaining political influence after its 
physical power had waned. When Britain emerged from the 
Second World War too enfeebled to insist on its views, it 
wasted no time in mourning an irretrievable past. British 
leaders instead tenaciously elaborated the "special 
relationship" with us. This was, in effect a pattern of 
consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became 
psychologically impossible to ignore British views. They 
evolved a habit of meetings so regular that autonomous 
American action somehow came to seem to violate club rules. 
Above all, they used effectively an abundance of wisdom and 
trustworthiness of conduct so exceptional that successive 
American leaders saw it in their self-interest to obtain 
British advice before taking major decisions. It was an 
extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal 
claim; it was formalized by no document? it was carried
8forward by succeeding British governments as if no 
alternative were conceivable. Britain's influence was great 
precisely because it never insisted on it? the "special 
relationship" demonstrated the value of intangibles2
What is striking about this account is its emphasis on 
the importance of the manner of the relationship's conduct, 
the informality, the (deliberately conditioned) habit of 
consultation and, to paraphrase Harold Macmillan, the 
willingness of London to play Athens to Washington's Rome. 
Such a manner led Kissinger to make the additional 
observations that:
One feature of the Anglo-American relationship was the 
degree to which diplomatic subtlety overcame substantive 
differences. In reality, on European integration the views 
of Britain's leaders were closer to de Gaulle's than to 
ours; an integrated supranational Europe was as much 
anathema in Britain as in France. The major difference 
between the French and the British was that the British 
leaders generally conceded us the theory —  of European 
integration or Atlantic unity —  while seeking to shape its 
implementation through the closest contacts with us. Where 
de Gaulle tended to confront us with faits accomplis and 
doctrinal challenges, Britain turned conciliation into a 
weapon by making it morally inconceivable that its views 
could be ignored.3
If we accept that the three elements of common 
culture, shared interests and a particular manner of 
handling Anglo-American affairs are the defining 
characteristics of the special relationship, then a sound 
argument can be made for accepting the Second World War as 
the period within which the special relationship was mainly 
formed, despite Kissinger's comment (which I readily accept 
as a qualification) about post-war elaboration. Whereas the
9common culture of course has a considerable history, 
interests were not shared as fully prior to the war as 
during it and since. One need only consider the American 
people's sustained isolationist sentiment between the First 
World War and even beyond the outbreak of fighting in 
Europe in 1939 as compared with the perceived congruence of 
interests in the wars against both Hitler and Hirohito and 
in the Cold War that followed, to see that this is so. 
Similarly, the unprecedented closeness of the American and 
the British governments and the scope of the consultation, 
which included most departments of both administrations in 
almost all aspects of the war effort, including even the 
Manhattan Project, were uniquely a product of the Second 
World War.
Bearing in mind that the close consultation only arose 
in the Second World War, we can for the purposes of this 
study put to one side the argument of H. C. Allen that the 
special relationship grew steadily from the Eighteenth 
Century onwards, with its contention that the promulgation 
of the Monroe Doctrine, the success of isolationism and the 
freedom of the American Civil War from European 
intervention were all facilitated by British naval 
protection. The growth mainly occurred during the Second 
World War, with the extreme need to protect the British 
Isles against both a direct invasion and a subsequent 
blockade by German forces, the later use of Britain as a
10
staging area for Operation Overlord and the continuing 
requirement for coordination between all the Allied forces 
(American, British, and Commonwealth) in the other theaters 
of the war.
The contention of British historian H. G. Nicholas that 
the special relationship dates from the First World War 
does not hold true given the definition I have offered. The 
acknowledgement by the two states of strategic 
interdependence and the setting up of one joint naval 
command do not come close to the intimacy of the liaison in 
the war that followed.
Thus, I find myself basically in agreement with 
Professor Coral Bell, who dates the special relationship 
from 1940, while acknowledging that an "unavowed alliance" 
began with the Monroe Doctrine. However, in accepting 
Kissinger's observation that the relationship was 
assiduously elaborated on after the war, it is worth noting 
that Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech at 
Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, 
also contained the phrase "a special relationship" and 
helped give it a degree of popularity. The American public 
and press were at the time indifferent, if not openly 
hostile to the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. Yet the 
perception in the years that immediately followed that 
international communism was a growing menace made Britain 
seem an increasingly attractive partner in world affairs.
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This was particularly true among the American political 
elite, but they were careful not to acknowledge this in 
public. Journalist David Dimbleby and historian David 
Reynolds relate in their book An Ocean Apart the delightful 
anecdote of Dean Acheson discovering in 1950 a memo written 
by a subordinate in which reference was made to the special 
relationship. Ordering all copies of the offending document 
be burned, Acheson acknowledged "the genuineness of the 
special relationship" but believed the memo "could stir no 
end of a hullabaloo, both domestic and international."4
Thanks to the insight of the social sciences that the 
world of human affairs exists largely in the manner that 
the majority of people think it exists, we must acknowledge 
this particular date as important, as the special 
relationship would become more and more an accepted fact of 
Anglo-American relations to the extent that politicians and 
bureaucrats heard it first named and then realized it 
themselves as a possibility and finally took it for 
granted. After Kennedy assumed the Presidency, White House 
aide McGeorge Bundy was authorizing a press release that 
stated " 'Special relationship' may not be a perfect 
phrase, but sneers at Anglo-American reality would be 
equally foolish."5
Given either the immediate need for close cooperation, 
as in the Second World War, or the promulgation of the idea 
of the relationship as being essential for the maintenance
12
of peace and the growth of what Churchill called "world 
organization", the intimate manner of the consultative 
process became self-reinforcing, as noted by H. G.
Nicholas:
The working relationships thus established not only 
guarantee a smooth discharge of decisions arrived at the 
highest levels? they reflect and create a climate of common 
purpose and frank discussion. Consequently they persist, by 
a healthy momentum of their own, even when, as at Suez, 
rupture and conflict impair the functioning of "the highest 
levels."6
Such working relationships require large staffs in the 
embassies of each state to the other and we may well agree 
with Nicholas' observation on the diplomats involved that, 
"What the activities of these practitioners are helping to 
create is hardly indeed, in the conventional sense of the 
term an alliance at all? it is more nearly a community."7 
The facility with which working relations are conducted and 
the possibility of a community are both helped by the fact 
that, as Arthur Campbell Turner observed of the 
demographics of Americans with a British background in 
1930, "The British immigrants...tended to occupy a more 
than average proportion of professional and administrative 
posts."8 Despite the fact that American foreign policy now 
has a heavy emphasis on relationships with nations of the 
Pacific Rim, it is unlikely that the American establishment 
can develop an equivalent special relationship with, say, 
Japan, unless circumstances conspire to force the two 
nations together and, perhaps more importantly, there are
13
enough Asian Americans in high political and administrative 
office who have that intangible "feel” for the other 
nation.
To describe the special relationship as having certain 
characteristics and even to go into the ramifications of 
those characteristics is not, however, sufficient to 
capture the special relationship in its totality. In order 
to do that, we must catch the relationship ”on the wing", 
as it were. Only by seeing how the relationship manifests 
itself in specific events over a period of time and how 
those events can in their turn effect the relationship can 
the relationship be fully understood. In other words, the 
relationship, while susceptible to characterization, can 
best be understood, like many other social phenomena, as a 
process, rather than as a thing. For this reason, the 
decision by the British government under Margaret Thatcher 
to accept cruise without dual-key has to be analyzed in the 
context of the how the American and British governments 
have in the past handled their relationship in the fields 
of nuclear energy and weapons and nuclear weapons delivery 
systems.
CHAPTER II 
WHOSE BOMB IS IT ANYWAY?
It took some time for the British to persuade the 
Americans that British scientists could make a useful 
contribution to the effort to research and construct the 
atomic bomb which had been theorized about before even the 
outbreak of the Second World War. Once cooperation on 
nuclear matters got under way and the construction of an 
atomic weapon seemed likely, it was then necessary for the 
two allies to begin to formalize their relations in the 
whole atomic field.
The single most important agreement on atomic affairs 
came with the signing by Churchill and Roosevelt of the 
Quebec Agreement in August, 1943. This gave the British an 
effective veto on the American use of the atomic bomb, 
thanks to the stipulation that neither state would use the 
weapon against a third party without the consent of its 
ally. As a quid pro quo and one which was intended to allay 
suspicions in Congress of British intentions with regard to 
the commercial exploitation of atomic energy after the end 
of the war, the British agreed that the American President 
could set the terms for the industrial and commercial use
14
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of atomic energy in the future. This effectively allowed 
the Americans to dictate how the British could develop 
their post-war atomic energy program.
The Ottawa agreement was further clarified in September 
1944 by the Hyde Park aide-memoire. also signed by the two 
leaders. In this, it was agreed that the two countries 
would continue their full collaboration in developing 
nuclear energy for military and commercial purposes until 
this was terminated by joint agreement. In due course, 
Churchill gave his agreement to the use of atomic bombs 
against Japan, though he was not consulted about specific 
targets and did not consider his agreement to be more than 
a formality.
However, it soon transpired that some members of the
American government were deeply unhappy with the terms of
the Quebec Agreement and the aide-memoire as Simon Duke
explained in US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom.
Dean Acheson had argued against the acceptability of the 
Quebec Agreement primarily for strategic reasons, but the 
official line of argument was political. It was argued that 
the agreement imposed a restraint upon the President's 
power as Commander-in-Chief to act freely in the national 
interest and it was therefore unconstitutional. At the end 
of 1945 there were moves afoot to change the agreement, 
with a recommendation to the Combined Policy Committee that 
a new document should be prepared to replace the Quebec 
Agreement 1 in toto1. The new proposal in its first clause 
recommended that the governments of the US, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom 'will not use atomic weapons against other 
parties without prior consultation with each other', thus 
aiming directly at Clause 2 of the Quebec Agreement which 
had expressed atomic weapons would not be used without each 
other's consent. The meeting between Truman, Attlee and 
Mackenzie-King of Canada in November 1945, and subsequent
16
meeting, failed to persuade Britain to give up her veto 
right.
Yet matters took a very different semblance the
following year, as the Americans became most unwilling to
continue to share their atomic secrets. Not only did Truman
and some of his senior advisors, like Secretary James
Byrnes, feel this way, so did the Senate Atomic Energy
Committee, as Robin Edmonds, a former official with the
British Foreign Office, explained in his book, Setting the
Mould. Following the British decision to build a plutonium
-producing reactor and the discovery of a spy ring in
Canada, which included Alan Nunn May, a British physicist
who had worked on the Montreal atomic project, the
Committee acted swiftly. In the space of nine days, they
amended a section of the McMahon bill on atomic energy and
provided for the full range of penalties for criminal 
actions involving unauthorized dissemination of 'restricted 
data' which was defined in terms that allowed very little 
latitude.10
This prohibited the passage of atomic information from the 
United States to any other country. McMahon himself years 
later agreed that had he been told of Anglo-American 
cooperation in the atomic field, the legislation would have 
been less restrictive. It would take Eisenhower and the 
shock of the Sputnik launch to persuade Congress that 
cooperation in atomic affairs should be fully resumed with 
the United Kingdom. In the meantime, the British initiated 
their own program for the development of an atomic bomb,
17
out of fear of renewed American isolationism, of a need to 
remain a great power and of a desire to bring the Americans 
to believe that the partnership might, indeed should, be 
renewed.
In January of 1948, the Americans and the British 
revised their arrangements on atomic matters in a document 
called the modus vivendi. The United States was to receive 
a much greater share of the uranium ore coming out of the 
Congo, which had previously been divided on a fifty-fifty 
basis, in return for renewed cooperation and exchange of 
information with Britain. Also, the British power of veto 
over the American use of atomic weapons was dropped, in 
return for the Americans dropping their restrictions on the 
British industrial development of atomic energy. In keeping 
with what was becoming standard practice for the post-war 
relationship, the modus vivendi was a general declaration 
of intent and no document was ever signed. Thus, the 
President did not have to refer the matter to Congress. 
Secrecy was maintained on both sides of the Atlantic.
Opinions on the quality of the agreement vary. The view 
of Lord Sherfield, who participated in the negotiations, is 
that the modus vivendi opened the door slammed shut by the 
McMahon Act. The other view, propounded by Margaret Gowing, 
is that the British gave away their veto over the American 
use of atomic weapons for too little in return.
18
Margaret Gowing, the official historian of Britain's 
atomic energy program, criticizes the modus vivendi for 
giving away the British veto at all, when the American use 
of the atomic bomb might eventually have led to Britain's 
"annihilation." The use of the word "annihilation" in this 
context is tendentious. After all, the veto was given up in 
January 1948 and the Soviet Union was not known to have 
acquired its own atomic capability until 1949. From the 
perspective of the British government of the time, it might 
have seemed much more pressing to acquire the additional 
wherewithal to develop its own atomic industry than to 
worry about the possibility of the Soviet Union sometime in 
the future dropping an atomic device on London because of 
something the Americans had done. Even if one does not 
share Gowing's views fully, one can still agree with her 
that the British giving up of the veto was strange in one 
particular respect, that the British did not even press to 
have the word "consultation" substituted for the word 
"consent," though the British chiefs of staff had proposed 
this in 1947.
Shortly after the veto was given up, there came the 
Berlin crisis and a turn of events which had serious 
implications for Anglo-American relations in matters of the 
control of American atomic delivery systems based in 
British territory. To understand this we must go back to
19
1945 and some talks between USAAF General Carl Spaatz and 
the British Air Marshal, Sir Arthur Tedder.
The two men were concerned about the strength and 
growing influence of the Soviet Union and the weakness of 
post-war Europe. They pondered that if the USA wanted to 
deploy its B-29 bombers to Europe, no British airfield 
could accommodate them and so they decided in July 1946 
that four bases should be made ready for these aircraft by 
mid-1947. Atomic bomb assembly and loading facilities were 
constructed at some bases. All of this was done without any 
public debate on the subject. The Strategic Air Command had 
in March 194 6 implemented a policy of "rotating" small 
units of B-29s abroad to give crews training in regions 
where they might operate in the future. The new bases fit 
in with the rotation scheme perfectly. None of the 
Silverplate B-29s (those converted to carry atomic weapons) 
were actually based in Europe until the summer of 1949, but 
for propaganda purposes, non-Silverplates still had the 
reputation of being atomic bombers.
The 1948-49 blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Union led 
not only to a massive airlift, but also to the British 
government agreeing to base sixty American B29s. The sixty 
arrived in July 1948, with the total number rising to 
ninety in September of the same year. However, the 
circumstances of this deployment were most revealing of how 
the special relationship was evolving in the Cold War era.
20
Baylis accounts for the aircrafts* arrival as follows:
The reasons for the arrival of the aircraft in Britain, at 
least initially, were political rather than military. They 
were a token of US interest in the defence of Europe. Their 
symbolic effect was emphasized by the fact that although 
the B29 was the American delivery vehicle for atomic 
weapons the B29s in Britain were not modified until 1949/50 
to carry nuclear bombs.11
Investigative journalist and defence specialist Duncan 
Campbell provides additional and more detailed evidence in 
The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, his book on the American 
military presence in the United Kingdom. He explains the 
schedule for the B29 force being converted to Silverplates 
and for some being based in Britain.
At the end of 1948, the 30 Silverplate aircraft were still 
at their US home base of Roswell, New Mexico. Gradually, 
the rest of the force was converted, and the first A-bomb 
carriers came to England in 1949. By late 1950, all the 
bombers returning to Britain from the United States on 
"rotational tours" had been converted.12
What is most striking, however, is that according to 
Campbell, the British government itself did not know 
whether the B-29s were Silverplates or not. If this were 
not remarkable enough, Duke guotes a Foreign Office 
document that:
The USAF already had the informal authority to rotate 
medium bomber groups to the United Kingdom under the 
Spaatz-Tedder agreement and that *we seem committed to the 
proposal [to base the 60 B-29s] in principle, a fact of 
which the Prime minister does not appear aware1.13
Finally, Campbell notes, "no guestions were raised at the
political level about the terms and conditions of the
Americans* tenure"14 Taken together, these facts indicate a
21
profound confusion in the British government's management 
of its defence relations with the USA. A naive trust 
substituted for decision-making based on facts, clearly 
defined policy aims, and coordination between different 
parts of the British administration.
Exactly why the British were so keen to allow the 
bombers to be based in Britain remains a little unclear. 
Baylis observes that:
Mr Bevin [the British Foreign Secretary] in particular 
welcomed the presence of US bombers in Britain as helping 
to bind the United States closer to Western European 
defence.15
Duke gives a more complex explanation for the acceptance:
Fear of Russian expansionist aims in Europe following the 
successful Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the imminent 
withdrawal of Russia from the Berlin Kommandatura, fear of 
an American retreat into isolationism that characterized 
the interwar years, and last, but not least, the Spaatz- 
Tedder agreement effectively making any other decision 
improbable.16
To this list we might add Britain's profound economic and 
military weakness. Yet all these compelling reasons for 
admitting the bombers are not reasons for handling the 
matter in such a confused manner. Furthermore, there was 
certainly no public discussion about the B-29 deployment. 
(This silence regarding military nuclear affairs has since 
become an established fact of British political life.) It 
is difficult to disagree with Duke's conclusion that while 
the British government had considered the implications of
22
temporary presence, little attempt had been made to 
consider the future.
However, as investigative reporter David Henshaw 
explained in an article on dual-key in The Listener 
magazine, the Americans had been eager to get air bases in 
Britain for quite some time:
But right from the start there was a considerable 
discrepancy between American plans for the bases and the 
official British version of how long they were here for and 
what they were equipped to do. Only one MP —  the renegade 
Labor lawyer John Platts-Mills —  questioned the arrival of 
the B-29s: he was told they were here on a temporary 
mission for "goodwill and training." And yet on the very 
day the bombers flew in, the American Defence Secretary, 
James Forrestal, wrote in his diary: "We have the 
opportunity now of sending these planes, and once sent, 
they would become something of an accepted fixture." If the 
American were keen to seize this opportunity, it was 
because their planes were still limited in range; so that, 
while they still had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, they 
needed forward bases, close to the Soviet Union, from which 
to launch an attack. Documents previously classified as 
"top secret", but now available under the American Freedom 
of Information Act at the National Archive in Washington, 
show that as early as October 1945 the Pentagon generals 
were considering a policy of "first strike" and that 
Britain was one of three base areas close to the USSR that 
they might have to "seize and hold." In July 1948, the 
bases were obtained by invitation.17
The Americans began to develop this strategic facility 
soon thereafter. September 1948 saw the United States 
initiate negotiations between the American and British 
Chiefs of Staff to allow the construction of buildings at 
the Sculthorpe and Lakenheath bases to house components of 
atomic bombs. Silverplate B-29s first arrived in April 1950 
and the President approved the stockpiling of non-nuclear 
components of atomic bombs in the UK in July 1950, which
23
meant that only the nuclear cores need be moved to Britain 
in the event of a crisis. For a while, the American view 
was that Britain was too vulnerable a location for 
stockpiling all the components or complete nuclear weapons. 
This view changed with the coming of the Eisenhower 
administration and in June 1953, the President agreed that 
the US military could store complete nuclear weapons at 
bases abroad.
As of 1950, all Western nuclear weapons remained 
entirely under American control. A 1950 plan to transfer 
some atomic bombs to the British was killed by the State 
Department, which emphasized the need to maintain the 
American stockpile and the possibility that the British 
might not actually use the weapons in the event of war. 
British concern about American bases centered around the 
costs of construction work. The Ambassador's Agreement of 
April 1950 (an exchange of letters between the US 
Ambassador and a representative of the British government) 
confirmed how the bases were to be expanded and how the 
construction costs were to be shared. There was also an 
assurance of the British right to terminate the agreement. 
Yet that was all. The stationing of American forces was not 
given a time limit and there was no attempt to secure 
British control over the use of the bases.
If the British were anxious about the Berlin blockade, 
they had a good deal more to be anxious about two years
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later. With Truman’s threat to end the Korean war by using 
atomic bombs, the British found that: they did not have 
either a veto over nor a right to be consulted about the 
American use of atomic weapons; the Americans did have an 
atomic weapons delivery system on British soil? the British 
did not have anv agreement at all on the operational use of 
the bases given over to the Americans. Worse still, the 
Soviet Union now did have the capability to retaliate with 
atomic weapons against an ally of the United States (for 
instance, Great Britain) if one of its friends (for 
instance, the newly-formed People's Republic of China) were 
victim to Truman's threat. Prime Minister Attlee hurried 
across the Atlantic to dissuade President Truman from 
acting on his threat. No doubt he was hastened on his way 
by the fact that the British were at that time wholly 
ignorant as to the contents of the US Strategic Air Plan. 
Clearly, from the British point of view, that they should 
have no control over the use of the bases and no idea of 
how the USAF might drop its atomic bombs was a state of 
affairs which could not be allowed to continue, no matter 
how "special" the relationship. Attlee's meeting with 
Truman was riddled with ambiguity. Truman was willing to 
promise "consultation" verbally, but would not put this in 
writing. The Americans again fell back on their argument 
about the President being unable to limit his powers as
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Commander-in-Chief. The final wording of the communique 
was:
The President stated that it was his hope that world 
conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. 
The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his 
desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of 
developments which might bring about a change in the 
situation.18
This was the only document which emerged from the meeting. 
The Americans refused to accept the British record of the 
meeting, since it contained the word "consultation" with 
reference to atomic bombs. Attlee nevertheless affirmed to 
the Cabinet in December 1950 that the British would be 
consulted except in "an extreme urgency" and told the House 
of Commons that the President's assurances were "perfectly 
satisfactory. "19
The British were in fact still concerned about the need 
for consultation and their lack of knowledge about the US 
Strategic Air Plan. They continued to raise the issue in 
1951, with the Foreign Secretary's visit to Washington in 
September. This led to more talks, involving the British 
Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, and representatives of the 
Truman administration. Consultation was again affirmed by 
the Americans in private, but Franks was concerned to get 
something agreed upon for public consumption before the 
British general election of October 25. The agreement was 
in fact made public after that date when Churchill 
announced it in the House of Commons in December 1951.
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The agreement which was reached is the form of words 
still used by the British government today in reply to any 
query regarding its degree of control over the use of 
American bases on British territory and the nuclear weapons 
and the delivery systems that are stationed there. The 
relevant sentence reads: f,The use of these bases in an 
emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her
Majesty*s Government and the United States Government in
• • • • • 20the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time."
The crucial words here are "joint decision" and much of the 
cruise missile debate in Britain has been over their exact 
meaning. This debate over the interpretation is a matter 
for the next chapter.
At the January 1952 summit between Churchill and 
Truman, the talks proceeded in the same manner as previous 
talks. Consultation about the use of atomic weapons from 
bases in Britain was affirmed, but not included in any 
written statement. The final communique again used the 
"joint decision" wording. However, Churchill did make the 
very real gain of being briefed on the Strategic Air Plan.
Following the first test of an atomic bomb by Britain 
in October 1952 and the election of Eisenhower, further 
agreements about the US bases, in terms of what facilities 
would be provided and at what cost, were made between the 
two countries, but as usual not in the form of a treaty, as 
that would have necessitated disclosure in Parliament and
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to the public of the terms. From 1954 onwards, the McMahon 
Act was gradually watered down and it was repealed in 1958. 
This led to Britain obtaining the information necessary to 
build atomic power plants for submarines, which in turn 
allowed the British to accept the offer of the Polaris 
missile system in 1962, since they could build the 
submarines to carry them. (In May 1957, the British proved 
that they were not so far behind in other fields by 
detonating their first thermonuclear device.)
The 1956 Suez crisis severely strained the special 
relationship but it is an indication of just how 
extraordinary the relationship can be that one of the first 
steps taken by the Americans to restore it to its former 
good health was to offer Britain some intermediate-range 
Thor ballistic missiles (IRBMs), free. The offer was made 
in January 1957. Prime Minister Macmillan accepted the 
offer at a conference with President Eisenhower at Bermuda 
in March of the same year. All 60 Thors were in service by 
May 1960. As well as wanting to restore the special 
relationship, Macmillan was also eager for the British to 
have a missile system which they had not at that stage been 
able to develop themselves and for the British military to 
have hands-on experience with state-of-the-art missile 
technology.
The Americans had a number of compelling motives for 
stationing IRBMs in the United Kingdom. The New Look
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defence policy had led to an emphasis on relying on nuclear 
weapons to take the place of large, conventional forces. 
Many tactical and theater nuclear weapons systems were 
deployed in Europe at this time to bolster the relatively 
small NATO forces in the face of an overwhelming Soviet 
conventional capability. In The Politics of Weapons 
Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy. Michael Armacost 
draws an interesting parallel between Thor and the B29 
bomber.
Above all, however, the transfer of Thors was appealing 
because, as in 1949, in adjusting to a technological 
revolution in strategic delivery systems, the United States 
found itself developing first-generation systems whose 
range required advanced bases for any strategic utility.
And as in the late 1940s when B29s were emplaced on British 
bases, the desire for immediate deployment overcame the 
reluctance to resume a posture of mutual dependency.21 
Thus, deployment was spurred by the quickening technology
race between the USA and the USSR, a race which would come
to public attention later in the year with the launch of
the Sputnik satellite. Finally, one should not overlook the
fact that the British agreed to pay for the privilege of
basing the weapons, a minor factor, but one sure to appeal
to the budget-conscious Eisenhower.
In an article in the (London) Sunday Times the
newspaper's defence correspondent made one of the few
recent public mentions of the agreements for the control of
the sixty Thor missiles:
After a succession of nuclear developments in the mid-50s, 
something much more specific [than the 1952 agreement] was 
needed. In the run-up to the arrival of Thor missiles, and 
soon after the acquisition of the British independent
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deterrent, Harold Macmillan, then prime minister, put his 
mind to negotiating a detailed and precise "procedural 
paper." The result, thrashed out between Patrick (now Sir 
Patrick) Dean, a deputy under-secretary at the Foreign 
Office, and a State Department official named Murphy, is 
still so classified that it is not supposed to exist. The 
agreement lays out just how the command and control of 
American nuclear forces based in Britain would work in time 
of crisis.
Since 1958 it has been adapted to take account of 
subsequent nuclear developments, and it has been reaffirmed 
every time a new prime minister or president takes office. 
It makes clear that the release of nuclear weapons from 
British soil cannot take place without the prior agreement 
of the British government. That is a much better guarantee 
than any of America's other allies have secured [under the 
1962 Athens Guidelines].22
Campbell, however, claims that Dean-Murphy did not 
significantly modify the existing arrangements. It is 
widely accepted that the secret part of the Anglo-American 
base agreements is periodically updated. The extent to 
which any single update marks a "significant" change is 
largely a matter of conjecture.
Until 1989, the arrangements for control over Thor and 
the rationale for the arrangements had seemed quite 
straightforward. The rationale was that only physical 
control was finally sufficient for the British national 
interest. Rather than accept the missiles free, even with 
dual-key control, the deal was that the British would in 
fact own the missiles, the Americans the warheads. The 
British would provide the base facilities. Dual-key was 
promoted as a sign of renewed trust between the USA and UK. 
The announcement that the missiles would come to Britain
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and the terms of their siting was made on February 27,
1958.
It is national policy in Britain to keep secret 
documents under lock and key for thirty years. At that time 
their current status is assessed again and some are 
released. When the papers for 1958 were released in 1959, 
The Observer reported that there had been a second, secret 
part to the Thor basing agreement:
Britain was forced onto deceiving its own public; although 
Macmillan persuaded President Eisenhower to let the 
missiles have British crews while the US controlled the 
warheads, he also accepted a secret second half to the 
deal. In the secret letters of understanding, the Americans 
were promised that they could apply to instal more Thor 
missiles, with US crews, when and if they wanted.
Meanwhile, [Defense Secretary] Sandys told the Commons the 
US had not asked to control the missiles themselves.23
Further, Macmillan had even considered scrapping the
British nuclear deterrent on the grounds that it was more
for prestige than military use and cost too much.
The dual-key control of Thor had two crucial political
limitations. The first was its applicability to a limited
number of a potentially larger number of missiles. The
second, and politically most important limitation, was that
dual-key was limited to the Thor system. This physical
control over Thor by the British led to Macmillan being
asked what control the British government had over the SAC
bases and their nuclear weapons. Macmillan replied:
I have the assurance of the US government that pilots have 
specific instructions not to arm the weapons until they are 
directly ordered to do so in order to carry out an
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operation of war. Such an order would be given after 
agreement between the two governments.24
Small wonder, then, that during the 1983 controversy 
about a dual key for cruise, the Conservative government 
tried to bury the idea as quickly as possible. If it had 
come to light that the Thor dual-key arrangement had been 
part of a larger and secret deal by a previous Conservative 
administration, that would have been highly inflammatory in 
itself. But actually having a dual-key for cruise would 
have made Prime minister Thatcher as vulnerable as 
Macmillan to the same questions regarding British control 
over other American nuclear systems based in the United 
Kingdom.
Barely was the Parliamentary debate (and Sandys' lying) 
over than both governments found themselves severely 
embarrassed, as Macmillan recalled:
There was a great "flap" this morning over an extraordinary 
statement by a certain Colonel Zinc —  an American "Eagle 
Colonel" of the Air Force who claims to be about to take 
over operational command of the rockets and rocket bases in 
England. As this is in direct contradiction (a) to the 
terms of the agreement published last Monday (b) what we 
told Parliament on Monday and in the debate yesterday. 
Colonel Zinc has put his foot in it on a grand scale.
As Baylis notes:
The Prime Minister no doubt had the "Colonel Zinc incident" 
in mind when he went to Washington on 7 June 1958. In his 
discussions with the American President, Macmillan once 
again brought up the question of US bases in Britain and 
the use of bombs and warheads which were under joint 
control. As a result both heads of state apparently 
initialled an agreement at the end of the talks which
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replaced "the loose arrangement made by Attlee and 
confirmed by Churchill."26
Both countries had agreed that the 1952 agreement was 
inadequate and had replaced it. Yet, when the debate began 
over accepting cruise, without a dual-key control, it was 
to the 1952 document that reference was exclusively made by 
the Thatcher government in public addresses and 
Parliamentary debate alike.
The Thor system was withdrawn from service in 1963. The 
system was one of liquid-fuelled missiles which were 
supposed to take some fifteen minutes to ready for launch 
and which were kept above ground. In fact, launch 
preparation took so many hours that it was possible that 
Thor might still have been on the ground when a second wave 
of Soviet missiles arrived. (It was even alleged that the 
missiles could be destroyed by rifle fire and a .22 rifle 
at that.) It was hardly surprising that they became more of 
a threat to the owner as a likely target for a wholly 
successful pre-emptive strike than a deterrent to the 
Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, in 1960, the American were allowed port 
facilities for their nuclear missile submarines at Holy 
Loch in Scotland, in return for allowing the British the 
right to purchase the Skybolt ballistic missile. Britain 
had also expressed an interest in acquiring Polaris. 
Macmillan recalled the deal in his memoirs.
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The President and I had merely exchanged a note and in 
return for Skybolt I had agreed, also * in principle1, to 
the establishment of an American submarine base in 
Scotland. Actual details were to be set out in a formal 
agreement....Everything was soon arranged, and the Minister 
of Defence was soon able to conclude a formal agreement 
regarding Skybolt, while maintaining our claim to Polaris, 
if this should at any time become necessary. It was this 
undertaking, entered into by President Eisenhower, that his 
successor was to honour, at my request, two years later.27
Though there was a Parliamentary debate about the base in
December, 1960, the Labor party was, happily for Macmillan,
sharply divided between those pressing for unilateral
nuclear disarmament and those advocating a multilateral
approach. This left it unable to launch an effective
opposition to the base agreement.
Once Skybolt failed miserably in testing, the British 
played on the special relationship to obtain Polaris and 
succeeded at the Kennedy-Macmillan Nassau summit in 
December 1962 in the face of strong opposition from some 
members of the Kennedy administration to having more than 
one center of command in a time of crisis (such as the 
Cuban missile crisis which had transpired in October). In 
April 1963, the Polaris Sales Agreement was signed and 
Britain was assured of a deterrent for many years to come, 
with the Polaris submarine and the Vulcan bomber forces as 
its components. There was no question that these systems 
were anything other than wholly under British operational 
control. Though the British had to rely on the Americans 
for a great deal of nuclear technology, only the British
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could launch their Polaris missiles or their Vulcan 
bombers. With regard to the British proposal for an 
Atlantic nuclear force (a counter-proposal to the 
multilateral nuclear force the British detested for its 
very threat of taking away British control over British 
nuclear weapons), Harold Wilson assured the Commons on 
December 16, 1964, that there was no possibility of a 
dual-key control system for British Polaris missiles. After 
1964, public concern shifted from nuclear weapons to other 
issues and the politicians and the military in Britain were 




During the 1970s successive British governments became 
concerned about two nuclear weapons issues. One was the 
prospect of having to update Britain's nuclear deterrent 
for the 1980s and beyond as the Polaris missiles and the 
submarines carrying them approached obsolescence. As an 
interim step, the Heath government decided to update the 
Polaris system by putting multiple warheads on the missiles 
and the Callaghan government continued the programme.
The other issue was the apparent danger that the SALT 
II treaty might decouple the European members of NATO from 
the nuclear deterrent provided by American strategic 
systems. The fear was that SALT II would leave the two 
superpowers with a parity in strategic systems, while the 
Europeans would then be faced with a Soviet superiority in 
theater nuclear weapons. Theater nuclear weapons are 
nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft which both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact deploy in Europe and aim at targets in Europe. 
The two issues eventually became intertwined for the 
British at the Guadaloupe summit of the USA, Britain, 
France, and West Germany in January 1979.
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As part of the reevaluation of their deterrent, the 
British became concerned about the need to find a 
replacement for the Vulcan bomber as it grew older during 
the 1970s. The Carter administration was considering 
extending the life of the B52 bomber by giving it a 
stand-off capability. The aircraft would have a payload of 
cruise missiles that could be launched well away from the 
borders of the Soviet Union so that the B52 could leave the 
missiles to do the work of penetrating Soviet air defenses 
and delivering the nuclear warhead. The British thought 
that the Vulcan might also be remodelled in this way, but 
it transpired that the aircraft was simply too old. Yet 
this decision against using the Vulcan to launch cruise led 
to the missile system alone being viewed with increasing 
favor by the British defence establishment. Cruise 
represented a new technology, with the promise of being 
able to penetrate Soviet air defenses readily on a wide 
range of types of mission, with a nuclear or non-nuclear 
payload as desired. If there were any misgivings, they were 
mostly on the part of the Royal Air Force, who feared 
cruise might almost eliminate the need for piloted 
aircraft. Further, the missile appeared cheap if compared 
on a one-for-one basis with any of the larger ballistic 
missiles (though this cost-saving was illusory, being in 
fact outweighed by the considerable expense of the backup 
systems like the TERCOM guidance system and the satellites
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which serviced it and gave cruise its supposed extreme 
accuracy). This led to some debate about the suitability of 
cruise as the next generation British deterrent. The final 
decision was that the Trident I missile was the best option 
and that the Americans should be asked to sell it to 
Britain.
Meanwhile, all the members of NATO, including Britain 
and the United States, were becoming caught up in the 
debate about theater nuclear weapons. The first major 
discussion of the topic was when Western defense ministers 
gathered at Hamburg in January 1976 for a meeting of the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group. The first public expression of 
the debate was the October 1977 speech by West German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on the subject. The overriding 
concern of the United States was that this debate should 
end well for NATO, which had recently been shaken by a 
debate about the neutron bomb which had ended badly and 
divisively. Thus 1976 to 1979 saw a great deal of 
diplomatic activity both within NATO circles and outside 
it, among the member nations, as the allies tried to put 
together an agreement on theater nuclear weapons which 
would satisfy everyone. One crucial meeting was the 
Guadaloupe summit in January 1979.
Guadaloupe was convened at the behest of the White 
House. According to John Newhouse's account, in War and 
Peace in the Nuclear Age, it was probably the brainchild of
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Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser. At 
any rate it was Brzezinski who claimed credit for it later 
and who personally contacted the European heads of state, 
James Callaghan, Giscard d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt.
From the American viewpoint, Brzezinski told Newhouse, 
"We needed to establish some sense of strategic direction 
after the ERW [neutron bomb] debacle."28 Carter also needed 
European support for SALT II to encourage the Senate to 
ratify it. Carter's NSC staff saw the summit as the ideal 
opportunity to propose the deployment of cruise and 
Pershing II missiles as the answer to the theater nuclear 
weapons problem. Thus far, this idea had been discussed 
only at the lower levels of NATO.
The British saw Guadaloupe as the ideal time to 
approach the United States for Trident. Prime Minister 
Callaghan had an excellent rapport with Carter. Also, the 
summit itself was planned to be highly informal. The only 
other people present were the leaders' national security 
advisors and the leaders' families. Callaghan would 
therefore have the best opportunity to exert his personal 
influence over Carter.
As Callaghan recollects in his memoirs, Time and 
Chance, he was able to approach Carter when the President 
was alone. He explained that he needed to know the American 
position regarding a possible sale of Trident. Callaghan 
had already paved the way for the discussion by eliciting
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Schmidt's opinion that Germany would prefer that France was 
not the only European power with strategic nuclear weapons. 
This allowed him to argue that Britain might need Trident 
both for its own security and also to reassure the West 
Germans:
The President heard me out. He said that like Helmut 
Schmidt, he also was glad that Britain possessed the 
nuclear deterrent. He did not take up my comments about 
Germany directly, but said that he hoped that Britain as 
well as France would remain a nuclear power. In his view, 
it was better that there should be a shared responsibility 
in Europe, rather than that American should go it alone, as 
he would not wish the United States to be the only country 
in confrontation.29
Carter agreed that "he could see no objection to 
transferring this technology to the United Kingdom"30 and 
further agreed that two British officials should visit 
Washington to discuss the technical and financial details. 
(Neither Carter's 1982 memoirs, Keeping Faith, nor 
Brzezinski's 1983 memoirs, Power and Principle, give any 
account of the conversation. Callaghan's memoirs were 
published in 1987, by which time the Trident deal had been 
settled between the Thatcher and Reagan governments.)
Carter, Callaghan, and Schmidt agreed at Guadaloupe 
that cruise and Pershing II should be deployed to counter 
the growing number of SS-20 missiles being deployed by the 
USSR. They also agreed that continuing talks with the USSR 
might lead to an agreement that would eliminate the SS-20s 
and so avert any need for NATO to deploy the new weapons. 
These decisions were to become official NATO policy on
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December 12, 1979, when the alliance formally agreed to the 
deployment. The deploy-and-negotiate concept was popularly 
referred to as the "two-track” policy.
For the purposes of this study, there are two crucial 
questions regarding the decisions taken at the Guadaloupe 
summit. Was the British agreement to accept the basing of 
cruise missiles in the UK linked to the American agreement 
to sell Britain the Trident system? Was any decision taken 
about providing the cruise missiles with a dual key 
control?
The evidence collected by Newhouse leads him to 
conclude that the cruise basing and Trident sales were 
implicitly linked.
And was there a link between the two-track decision and 
Trident? "The link was never explicit," says a closely 
involved British official. "People here [in London] were 
well aware of the lurking danger of repeating the history 
of the early sixties [a reference to Skybolt]. We had 
expected a very tough negotiation, but it turned out we 
were pushing on an open door."31
Newhouse also asked David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy, about 
a possible link.
"We expected a lot of help from the British [on the two- 
track decision]," says Aaron. "And it wasn't necessary to 
link support for it and the Trident. The Brits were bending 
over backward to help. 'You want to deploy cruise missiles 
in Britain,' they said. 'Go ahead and do it.'" According to 
Aaron, there was little resistance to approving Callaghan's 
request for Trident.32
In short, the British acquiescence to cruise deployment 
preempted any need for the Americans to make an explicit
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link. Both sides knew that an implicit link already 
existed.
Was the issue of control discussed at Guadaloupe? 
According to Aaron, it was.
"They never discussed the first question: Should we do this 
at all?" says David Aaron, who as deputy NSC advisor also 
played a major role. "They only discussed the mix of force 
options. Whether the weapons should be all US."33
The way in which Aaron phrased his remark and the fact that
he does not mention dual-control, suggests that the leaders
decided at Guadaloupe to deploy the missiles under sole
American control.
They would have had several compelling reasons for 
reaching such a decision. The issue of control over nuclear 
weapons based on West German territory has always been a 
delicate one for West German leaders, who have wanted the 
protection they believe is afforded by such weapons, but 
have not wanted to confront the USSR with a nuclear-armed 
West Germany. It has been in the best interests of the West 
Germans that no nuclear munitions on their territory are 
under their control. None of the leaders at Guadaloupe 
would have wanted to change this state of affairs, 
particularly while SALT II was still alive and well.
Further, the whole point of the new weapons was to 
couple the USA with its European allies, that is, to 
convince the USSR that the USA would use its nuclear 
weapons to defend those allies. Dual-key control might tend
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to weaken the deterrent value of the weapons, since the use 
of the weapons would be subject to more than one veto. 
Finally, it would have weakened the show of unity which 
theater nuclear weapons deployment was supposed to produce, 
if one nation opted for dual-key while others did not.
After Guadaloupe, a good deal of consultation and arm- 
twisting brought both the enthusiastic and the recalcitrant 
European members of NATO more or less behind the proposal 
to deploy the missiles. The first public announcement of 
the scheme was made by the Carter administration on January 
19, 1979. According to The New York Times, administration 
officials said that Guadaloupe conferees "made no firm 
decision on the missile question" but that they "agreed 
that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 'should explore 
very actively' its options..."34 Thus the Carter 
administration immediately put the issue into the NATO 
arena to avoid any impression that the four leaders were 
trying to dictate policy to the whole of Western Europe and 
to make it a vital issue for NATO, which would allow 
pressure to be put on NATO members which did not want to 
fall in line with the scheme.
When Schmidt tried to back away from the idea (by 
proposing siting the missiles at sea, while the whole point 
of them being land-based was their high visibility), the 
United States put on the pressure for acceptance. The 
formal proposal was presented to European leaders by David
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Aaron in late July and by early August, Carter's officials 
were confidently predicting that "the alliance could agree 
formally on a missile deployment plan by the end of the 
year.1,35
As events unfolded, various NATO study groups and 
committees fell into line by presenting favorable reports. 
The theater nuclear missiles proposal was put before the 
NATO Council on 12 December 1979 at a meeting in Brussels. 
All the member nations agreed in principle on the scheme, 
though it took some last minute bargaining to find a 
formula which would suit Belgium and Holland. Both 
countries had a strong anti-nuclear movement and a 
coalition government unsure of its ability to carry out 
deployment. Each country delayed accepting the missiles 
(Holland for two years, Belgium for six months) to give 
priority to the arms control track. All other NATO members, 
including Britain, accepted the proposal without 
reservations.
Throughout the run-up to the December meeting, the
issue of control for Britain surfaced very briefly in the
press. The New York Times reported on October 10:
The British, although they are willing to have the 
missiles, are likely to insist that some of the cruise 
missiles be built here under licence and that some be 
placed under British control, reaffirming Britain's 
position as a nuclear power.
This rather vague report (which gives no indication of how 
the "control" would be implemented) was contradicted on
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November 1, when the same newspaper ran a lengthy article,
"Now Europe Shuns Its Nuclear Trigger." This focused mainly
on West Germany and its reasons for not wanting dual-key,
but mentioned other nations which had refused.
Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands...have also indicated 
that they will probably want them [the missiles] controlled 
by a one-key system.37
Only ten days later, the British Defense Secretary Francis 
Pym was putting his full weight behind deployment of 
missiles without dual-key.
The secretary said that his first priority was reaching 
agreement with Britain's European partners in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization on the deployment of American- 
made and American-manned cruise missiles here and on the
• 38Continent.
The proposal presented in December included the offer to 
the European nations of a dual-key system, with a price tag 
which included some of the research and deployment costs. 
There were no takers.
Given that the December meeting was the culmination of 
many meetings and in-depth consultation, it is clear that 
the whole issue of dual-key control was settled in advance 
of the meeting. One can only speculate how far in advance. 
It seems highly likely that such a crucial topic would have 
at least been raised at Guadaloupe, probably by Schmidt. It 
is certainly possible that a single-key policy may have 
been agreed upon at that time, just as the dual-track 
policy was. Whether dual-key control was rejected at 
Guadaloupe or during the consultation process leading up to
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the NATO Council meeting, the rejection became part of 
official NATO policy on 12 December, 1979. The Thatcher 
government had committed itself to American control for the 
cruise missiles which were to arrive in the United Kingdom 
in 1983.
CHAPTER IV
THE DUAL KEY DENIED
Given that the Thatcher Government had committed itself 
to the deployment of American owned and operated cruise 
missiles, 1983 was to prove an extremely uncomfortable 
year. There was opposition to cruise right from the 
December 1979 announcement. That same month, British 
historian and anti-nuclear activist E. P. Thompson went 
full tilt at the policy in the course of several pages in 
the left-wing political weekly The New Statesman. Popular 
sentiment against cruise grew both in size and intensity as 
1983 drew nearer. In December 1982, some 30,000 women 
protested by encircling the Greenham Common air base, 
which, along with the Molesworth base, was to be the site 
for the weapons. By 1983, the issue dominated the British 
political scene.
Opposition to cruise coalesced into two groups. The 
unilateralist group centered around the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament and the Labor Party. The group in favor 
of dual-key was more diffuse. The Social Democratic Party 
favored dual-key control and there were sympathizers 
amongst both Labor and Conservative members of Parliament.
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Those members of the public backing dual-key included 
unilateralists and multilateralists. At the beginning of 
the year, an opinion poll conducted for The Sunday Times 
found a staggering 93% in favor of a dual-key for cruise.39
In reply to the Thatcher governments reliance on the 
"joint decision," a letter to The Times by a Dr. Terence 
Moore of Clare College, Cambridge put the opposing view 
most succinctly.
The test case for dual-key comes on the single, critical 
occasion where the President and the Prime Minister 
disagree. I need hardly elaborate on the possibly 
devastating importance of such an occasion.... For the UK to 
retain its essential responsibility for British-based 
nuclear weapons it should insist, as the SDP in its defence 
"White Paper" has insisted, on a double safety catch on 
American nuclear missiles based here in the UK. The 
country's self-respect demands no less.40
Moore's letter expressed popular support for dual-key very 
well. The British public was highly concerned that their 
government had no visible, physical control over the firing 
arrangements for the missiles and there was also the 
feeling that Britain was demeaned by the proposed 
arrangements.
The Conservative party itself, not normally given to 
the kind of internal feuding so prevalent in the Labor 
party, came close to a backbench revolt over dual-key. Alan 
Clark, member of Parliament for Plymouth, collected 38 
signatures from a broad spectrum of his fellow Conservative 
MPs, asking for "a mechanism for sovereign physical control 
of theatre nuclear weapons based in this country."41
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(Sovereignty was of course a highly-emotive issue in the 
wake of the Falklands war.) It was also felt by 
Conservatives in favor of dual-key that the presence of 
this control system would end much of the public opposition 
to the missiles. After all, the same opinion polls showed 
no majority against Britain's own nuclear deterrent. Senior 
Conservatives immediately put heavy pressure on Clark and 
he finally backed down.
Conservative ministers, led by the Secretary of State 
for Defense, Michael Heseltine, flatly rejected the notion 
of approaching the American government for dual-key. 
Heseltine argued in January that "in 1979 the Americans had 
offered a dual-key arrangement, but it had been declined by 
the Europeans."42 This was a clear reference to the 
ramifications for NATO of Britain deciding to break ranks 
and opt for dual-key. The following month, Conservative 
ministers were reassuring visiting Vice-President George 
Bush that they would not raise the issue with the United 
States. Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe reaffirmed his 
government's commitment to cruise when he visited 
Washington in July.
The Conservative government relied on a number of 
arguments against dual-key. One primary argument was that 
dual-key would cost too much. Another was that the 1952 
Churchill-Truman agreement for "joint decision" was 
sufficient and any attempt to modify it would severely
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damage the mutual trust enjoyed by the two nations. Other 
arguments were that the missiles were guarded by British 
Royal Air Force personnel, who were needed to help disperse 
the missiles to their launch sites and that installing 
dual-key would delay deployment.
The argument that dual-key would simply cost too much 
had the merit of being simple, thus more readily delivered 
to the public than abstruse calculations of deterrence. 
However, it was vulnerable to several counter-arguments.
The most obvious one was that even by the standards of a 
government committed to saving money wherever possible, it 
was sheer folly to balance the relatively modest financial 
benefit of free missiles against a foreign nation being 
able to use the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom 
for purposes which might lead to the annihilation of the 
British people.
Even taking the argument on its own terms, it had 
serious deficiencies. As is so often the case with 
calculations of defence expenditure, no-one could agree how 
much it actually would cost to buy into cruise, and, as is 
also so often the case, projections of the costs varied 
enormously.
One writer for The Economist came up with a relatively 
conservative set of figures:
During the 1979 negotiations on stationing cruise in 
Europe, the Americans proposed, not unreasonably, that, if 
the Europeans wanted to own the missiles, they should pay
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for them. The entire programme will cost about $5 billion 
(in 1980 dollars). Infrastructure costs —  buildings, 
storage magazines, roads and the like —  are shared across 
the alliance by an agreed formula. If the missiles were 
financed by the same formula, it would cost Britain around 
165m at current exchange rates. But, if the British were to 
buy them outright, the cost could range from at least 1300m 
to over 1500m. While that is not going to break a British 
defence budget of over 114 billion, it is not negligible.43
The defence correspondent of The Sunday Times demurred,
and suggested a much less negligible figure:
Installing a dual key would be straightforward enough. Just 
as in the late 1950s we bought 60 Thor rockets from America 
—  the only actual missile ever based in Britain —  so, 
now, we might buy cruise, for around 11 billion.44
The Conservatives of course gave the least conservative 
estimate of all:
Defence Minister Michael Heseltine said Sunday on 
television that Britain had rejected the idea of dual 
control when cruise missiles were first discussed. He said 
existing safeguards were satisfactory and Britain would 
have to buy the cruise system at a cost of $1.5 billion to 
gain dual control.45
The financial argument cruise was widely regarded 
outside the Conservative party as being merely a political 
ploy. It certainly can be seen as an attempt to set the 
debate in terms which would steer clear of discussion of 
the whole notion of "joint decision."
The argument in favor of relying on the Anglo-American 
base agreement had a number of serious drawbacks when used 
in political debate. One was that it was literally 
intangible. The idea of direct physical control was simple 
and much more concrete. Another drawback was that since the 
agreement was largely secret, there was little that could
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be said about it for public consumption. At least, that was 
what Conservatives claimed as they repeated the wording of 
the 1952 Churchill-Truman communique ad infinitum. 
Parliamentary exchanges such as the one following became 
commonplaces during the 1980s.
Mr. Cryer asked the Secretary of State for Defence, in the 
worst possible circumstances of a nuclear war, whether 
arrangements have been made for consultations with the 
United States of America on the use of cruise missiles in 
the few minutes available; and whether the United Kingdom 
government will have, at any stage of any nuclear 
confrontation , the inalienable, unqualified and 
unconditional right of veto over their use.
Mr. Pym: As I made clear again in yesterday's debate, the 
use of United States forces of the bases concerned in the 
United Kingdom would be a matter for joint decision between 
the two Governments in the light of the circumstances 
prevailing at the time. The bases may not be used without 
such a joint decision.46
This deliberate refusal to explain thoroughly how the
joint decision-making process would work lead to
contradictory interpretations. Thus, the British newspaper,
The Guardian carried what was for it an unusually
optimistic view of a nuclear weapons issue. The editorial
for November 6, 1983, noted this argument, as put forward
by Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine:
[Heseltine] said, no British government could signal 
conditions which it might wish to impose since it was the 
essence of a deterrent strategy that such things should be 
hidden from the Russians. That might be taken as a hint 
that arrangements between the two governments are tighter 
than official statements have revealed —  but it is hardly 
substantial enough to deter those who want a dual key from 
continuing to advocate it.47
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The Economist, however, was a good deal more skeptical 
about the implications of the secrecy surrounding the 
Anglo-American agreements:
[The agreement] implies a British right of veto before 
launching and is apparently much tighter than the "Athens 
guidelines" governing American nuclear weapons on the 
territories of other NATO countries, which promises 
consultation "time and circumstances permitting."
The problem is that the British public has to take it on 
trust that the Anglo-American agreement says what the 
government claims it does. Obsessed as usual with secrecy 
at any price, the British government has never publish the 
text. Unpublished, it can hardly be used as the basis of a 
campaign to make people pro-cruise. The poll seems to show 
either that the British public has never heard of the 
agreement, or that it does not believe it says what it is 
claimed to say. Mr Heseltine should see that it is 
published —  unless, after all, it is full of holes.48
Though the publications drew wholly different inferences
about what the secrecy meant, both commented on the severe
limitation of the agreement in making the case against
dual-key.
A third drawback was that while the Conservatives were 
trusting the United States for support in time of war, they 
were buying from that country the Trident missile system 
for use in exactly the circumstance of the United States 
failing to give its support. Conservatives trying to square 
the circle on that usually prefaced their remarks with a 
good deal of special relationship speechifying, then jumped 
over the contradiction into an impassioned explanation of 
why the United Kingdom required an independent deterrent.
The Parliamentary debate on cruise was held on 31 
October was a typically boisterous affair, particularly as
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it was held in the wake of the invasion of Grenada by the 
United States. This event was held by many to demonstrate 
the impotence of the Conservative government to influence 
the nation which was supposed to be so special to the 
United Kingdom. Despite the depth of feeling in the country 
in favor of dual key, the Conservatives survived the debate 
unscathed. Conservative members of Parliament did not break 
ranks to vote in favor of dual-key and as the Labor party 
was committed to a unilateralist platform, it was not 
prepared to support it either. Only twenty-two votes were 
cast for dual-key, all from MPs of the Social Democratic 
and Liberal parties.
The debate within the United Kingdom was only half of
the story, of course. The other half lay with the
Americans. Two main sources of information are available 
regarding American attitudes. One is the glut of official 
documents generated by Congress, particularly from 
Congressional committees. The other is the policymakers 
themselves.
The main problem in dealing with the documents is that,
for the purpose of this thesis, the most pertinent material
has been deleted on security grounds. However, some 
interesting points do emerge, particularly from a 
comparative reading of a number of documents.
Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons, prepared 
by the Congressional Research Service in 1975 from non­
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classified sources, is a good starting point. It states 
quite unambiguously that the President of the United States 
has sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, but 
adds that he may delegate this authority "virtually without
# ■ • 49 ,limitation" and that whether such delegations have been 
made is unknown. It goes on to say:
THe President's authority to order the use of theater 
nuclear weapons in the event of a war involving NATO, while 
subject to certain procedural arrangements, is similarly 
unlimited.50
It goes on to refer to an agreement to "consult" with NATO
allies and to emphasize that in any event, the President
will control U.S. theater nuclear forces even after they
have been assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(SACEUR —  NATO's highest ranking military officer). This
last, peculiar arrangement can be effected because SACEUR
is always an American officer (specifically, he is the U.S.
Commander in Chief, Europe) and so under the direct
authority of the President. The analysis surmises:
While a factor the President would undoubtedly consider, 
the agreement to consult hardly constitutes a constraint on 
his authority; more accurately, the obligation would serve 
to influence the President's policy decision. There is 
little reason to doubt that the President would consult 
with the heads of government of the NATO allies if such 
consultations were not considered prejudicial to the 
national interest, including the protection of America and 
allied forces.51
In neither the section about the United States not that
about the United Kingdom, is there any mention of any
bilateral arrangement regarding nuclear weapons or base
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use. Final authority for the British deterrent is said to 
lie with the Prime Minister and the study goes on to 
explain how British nuclear weapons are committed to NATO.
There are several striking points here. Nowhere is 
there any of the "joint decision" language which British 
governments emphasize. Britain is lumped together with the 
rest of NATO. Further, American consultation with NATO 
allies is regarded as being liable to certain 
qualifications. Finally, the lack of limitations on the 
President's authority is frequently repeated.
Other documents tend to repeat these points either 
singly or in various combinations. A typical example is 
another report by the Congressional Research Service, "The 
Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces," 
prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in 1980. The 
report notes:
Defense Minister Pym has indicated that the United Kingdom 
will have a degree of say in the authorization for use of 
the new systems. However, the precise implications of his 
statement are unclear.
Remarkably, in the midst of frequent use of the "joint 
decision" phrase, the CRS managed to find the sole occasion 
upon which a Conservative politician did not stick to that 
exact form of words.
If one has doubts about the quality of work done by the 
CRS, nevertheless, the records of hearings before the
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Senate Armed Services Committee for the annual Defense 
Department appropriations include similar emphases in 
statements given by people closely involved with American 
and NATO defense matters. In 1978, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense David McGiffert stated:
Theater nuclear forces are responsive to the direction of 
the political authorities... only the President can 
authorize their use, and that would be done only after 
consultation with our NATO allies.52
McGiffert omitted any reference to a bilateral agreement 
with the United Kingdom and went on to explain the Athens 
Guidelines and how the consultation required by them was 
qualified by time and circumstance. In 1982, General 
Bernard Rogers, then U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, 
replied to a query by Senator Goldwater, "The ultimate 
authority, Senator, is the President or the Prime Minister 
for their own weapons."53 He then went on to give a very 
brief description of the NATO arrangements for release of 
nuclear weapons, failing to mention Anglo-American nuclear 
arrangements, despite his immediately prior reference to 
the British Prime Minister.
The British press were on several occasions able to 
pose direct questions to present and past American 
policymakers. The main areas of interest were specifically 
how the Americans interpreted the "joint decision" formula 
and whether it was even still possible in 1983 to acquire 
the dual-key system so long after it had been rejected.
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The Times reported that American officials, from the
distant vantage point of Washington, were expressing bland
surprise that there was anything to debate. Interestingly,
while British politicians were proclaiming that the
Churchill-Truman accord was special, a State Department
official was lumping all the Europeans together.
Agreed procedures have been established within the 
alliance, in the event it should become necessary to 
consider the use of nuclear weapons [and] have proved fully 
satisfactory to successive allied governments...54
All European NATO nations except the UK fall under the
rubric of the Athens Guidelines, which agrees how the
United States would consult its allies if it wished to
release nuclear weapons from their territory. Yet the
British government did not refer to the Guidelines, since
these allow only for "consultation," rather than the "joint
decision" supposedly mandated by the Anglo-American
agreement. Whether the State Department official was merely
speaking in general terms, or had let slip that the true
American attitude was to treat all Europeans equally, can
only be a matter for conjecture.
The Reagan administration publically agreed with the 
Thatcher government’s reading of the 1952 document and both 
gave as their reason for not going into too much detail 
over the exact nature of the decision-making procedure that 
the Soviet Union had to be kept ignorant of such matters.
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Hence the following exchange between President Reagan and a 
British television journalist:
Mr. Suchet. Mr. President, a major issue in the British 
general election is the basing of American cruise missiles 
in Britain. Mrs. Thatcher has said in Parliament that she 
has received an explanation from you as to who will be in 
control of firing these missiles, but you, as yet, have 
said nothing publicly. Would you tell the British people 
who now is ultimately in control of firing these missiles, 
you or Mrs. Thatcher?
The President. Well, let me say that we will —  I don't 
think either one of us will do anything independent (sic) 
of the other. This constitutes a sort of veto power, 
doesn't it? But we have an understanding about this and 
would never act unilaterally with any of our allies on 
this.
Mr. Suchet. I think the British people are very concerned 
about the basing of these missiles in their own country. 
Perhaps they deserve to be all the more so, since you seem 
reluctant to say that the power to fire them does not rest 
with you.
The President. Well, they can rest assured. But my 
reluctance to say anything is based on the fact that we get 
dangerously into the area of telling others not friendly to 
us what our policies might be. And I don't think we should 
do that.55
While the British and the American governments of the 
day were busily broadcasting their interpretation of the 
words "a matter for joint decision," the British journalist 
David Henshaw was finding a very different interpretation 
amongst former members of past American administrations. 
Henshaw began with Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger's 
interpretation of the phrase:
[Churchill and Truman] issued a communique: the use of 
nuclear bases in Britain was to be "a matter for joint 
decision." Yes, but what if there were no "joint decision"? 
Would Britain have a veto? "The communique," said Mr 
Weinberger, "speaks for itself. I don't think it would
59
serve any purpose, nor would it be very helpful to you, in 
trying to elaborate on words that are perfectly clear."
He then went on to ask several former top American 
officials if they thought that the agreement gave the 
United Kingdom a veto. He began with Lucius Battle, who, as 
senior aide to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, helped draw 
up the deal.
So what does Lucius Battle think "a matter for joint 
decision" actually means? "I haven't the slightest 
idea...Each side perhaps believes, sees, views the 
agreement as exactly what he was trying to get... it1s part 
of diplomacy in a way." And did the Americans think they'd 
given a veto to the British? "No, absolutely not." Even of 
nuclear weapons based on British soil? "No." 56
This was also the opinion of one of Battle's
contemporaries, Eugene Zuckert, Assistant US Air Force
Secretary at the time the agreement was made.
And it was Mr Zuckert who, in the end, came up with a 
metaphor which left little room for ambiguity. "My feeling 
is that a 'joint decision' would mean that a one-one tie 
would be construed in favor of the Americans. In other 
words, it was not a veto."57
Other policymakers expressed similar views.
No American politician I spoke to thinks it gives Britain a 
veto over the use of the bases: according to Paul Warnke, 
who was Assistant Secretary of Defence under President 
Johnson, it's doubtful if most people in the Pentagon even 
know that the agreement exists. Robert McNamara, who had 
seven years in charge of Defence in the Sixties, said: "I 
don't conceive of it as a veto, no. I think 'consultation' 
means a discussion... with the party having the final 
authority —  in this case the US —  making the final 
decision." James Schlesinger, Richard Nixon's Defence 
Secretary, is a little more flexible: but in the end, do we 
have a veto? "I think it comes close to be a veto —  but 
the intention is that there be an intimate consultation." 
Not the same thing as a veto? "It is, if there is time 
available." The trouble with crises, of course, is that,
• 58invariably, time is rarely available.
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Henshaw then went on to ask how the agreement had been 
reached and to what end.
Certainly the Americans wanted Churchill to feel that —  as 
Lucius Battle puts it —  he'd had "a good visit.” As to 
what the agreement on the American bases really meant to 
each side, there was considerable ambiguity. "I don't 
believe that either side wished to mislead," says Battle.
"I think both sides felt they had got as far as they could 
in emphasizing the need for consultation, joint 
decision. .. if at all possible."59
Finally, Henshaw refers to an event which, in his view, 
completely destroyed any claim the 1952 agreement has to 
giving the British government a veto.
...three weeks after it [the communique] was announced the 
American Assistant Secretary of State Jack McFall, told 
Congress: "The talks were not in any sense negotiations 
towards final and binding decisions on the part of either 
government." The man taking over as British ambassador in 
Washington at the time of the Churchill-Truman agreement 
was Sir Roger Makin —  now Lord Sherfield. He couldn't 
recall the McFall announcement but, given the lack of faith 
that announcement suggested, how substantial did he think 
the 30-year-old agreement was today? "I think binding 
agreements dealing with matters of national security are 
very difficult to come by and not perhaps wholly to be 
relied upon."60
Simon Duke has also argued that the Americans do not
see the 1952 agreement (or similar agreements with other
NATO partners) as constituting a veto. He also quotes
former Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger:
Such consultation procedure does not imply any actual 
inhibition on the capability of the United States to 
operate the [nuclear] systems.61
He also points out that when the USSR seemed poised to 
intervene in the Yom Kippur war, the USA put its forces on 
Def Con III without consulting any of its allies. The
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British were told one hour after the decision was made. 
Schlesinger, Secretary of Defence at the time, later 
admitted there had been time for "consultation and 
discussion.1,62 Henry Kissinger's hindsight is even more 
chilling: "We could not have accepted a judgement different 
from our own."63
THus, the weight of evidence is against the 1952 
agreement being construed by the United States as a veto. 
Reagan and Weinberger refused to give an unequivocal 
assurance that the United Kingdom could indeed positively 
veto the use of cruise or the American bases in the UK. 
Other officials gave the unequivocal assurance that the 
United Kingdom did not hold a veto.
As for dual-key control over cruise, it seems likely 
that the Reagan administration was no longer offering it by 
1983. The evidence here is circumstantial. David Henshaw 
suggests that the offer was withdrawn:
Given the apparent desire of the British public to have a 
similar safeguard for cruise (according to the polls) —  
and given that Jimmy Carter's administration had offered 
dual key four years ago —  I asked Mr Weinberger if the 
offer still stood. As Christopher Wain suggested recently 
in THE LISTENER, it doesn't look like it. "The arrangement 
that we have," said the Secretary of Defence, "has always 
been considered completely satisfactory to both countries." 
So was he saying, in effect, we couldn't now buy a dual 
key? "I'm always worried about questions that start out 
'Are you saying, in effect?' What I'm saying is what I've 
just said."
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Also, The New York Times reported that Secretary of State 
George Schultz, on a visit to the United Kingdom in 1983, 
had "brushed the idea aside."65
Indeed, from the American perspective, why should dual­
key still have been available? The issue had been settled 
in 1979. To encourage hope of dual-key in 1983 would have 
been giving aid and comfort to Prime Minister Thatcher's 
enemies (inside and outside the Conservative party) and 
needlessly stirring up trouble in NATO at a time when 
maintaining a united front was essential.
CONCLUSION
The special relationship was characterized in chapter 
one as having three defining features. These were a common 
culture, shared strategic interests, and an informality in 
handling relations. The informal diplomacy permitted base 
agreements which were quickly drawn up and implemented and 
perceived by both parties as in their mutual strategic 
interest of containing potential Soviet expansion. The 
common culture made the presence of the US servicemen less 
of an intrusion than they might otherwise have been. Many 
of the British tended not to perceive them as truly 
"foreign" in the way that they perceived their fellow 
Europeans. The special relationship was absolutely 
essential to America being able to build up its forces in 
the UK so rapidly and to such a large size.
However, from the British perspective one major problem
emerged with the special relationship in the decade after
the end of the Second World. As John Bay1is observes:
Despite the 1948 modus vivendi. atomic energy clearly stood 
out against the web of inter-dependency which was being 
woven between the two states at this time66
The British thus went ahead with their own nuclear
programs, while using the informal diplomacy of the special
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relationship in their attempts to restore that relationship 
to its wartime status of closeness in nuclear matters.
The special relationship eventually permitted a 
solution to this problem and one which is unique in recent 
history. The solution was (and is) a cruid pro cruo in which 
the British received the nuclear technology they needed for 
their strategic interests and the Americans received the 
bases they needed for their strategic interests. This 
trade-off depends ultimately on successive British 
governments believing that the possession of a strategic 
nuclear deterrent is absolutely essential for Britain's 
survival. It also depends on the two nations perceiving 
their strategic interests as being broadly convergent. The 
informal diplomacy has made the handling of the quid pro 
quo relatively simple. The executive branches of both 
nations could largely circumvent their respective 
legislatures by relying on agreements that lacked the 
status of treaties. The governments could also rely on that 
style of diplomacy to ensure that the profound differences 
in interests which did and do exist need not be emphasized 
in political relations between the nations and that when 
disagreements do occur, they are quickly left behind.
Successive British and American governments have 
believed that the quid pro quo has yielded substantial 
benefits. The British can point to the purchase of 
strategic delivery systems and emphasize that these are
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independent in the one sense that British governments deem 
paramount: Britain ultimately has sole and complete control 
over their use. The Americans have their bases and a 
minimum of British control over their operational use, as 
contrasted with the troubles which have arisen over bases 
in, for instance, Spain and Greece.
Outside the nuclear arena, the cruid pro cruo 
relationship holds good, too. The British gained crucial 
American assistance during the Falklands war and later 
reciprocated by allowing the Americans to bomb Libya from 
the UK and by doing so in a most public manner. Each nation 
helped the other in the face of certain damage to its other 
interests. There is also an unusually high degree of 
cooperation in the intelligence field.
One crucial reason why cruid pro quo has remained a 
guide to action for so long is that in each country there 
are well-established bipartisan policies with regard to the 
other country. The unspoken agreement between Conservative 
and Labor party leaders that Britain requires a nuclear 
deterrent has led to an equally tacit agreement that the 
agreements on bases must be allowed to stand. This has 
overruled both nationalist sentiment within the 
Conservative party and unilateralist sentiment within the 
Labor party, either of which might have threatened the 
American bases. Since there tends to be more of a consensus 
in American politics regarding foreign policy, it is not
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surprising to see Reagan following the lead of Carter in 
supplying Trident. Finally, we must not underestimate the 
personal factor, in that many of the Presidents and Prime 
Ministers have struck up very good friendships despite the 
inevitable large differences in their backgrounds. Kennedy 
and Macmillan are perhaps the most striking pair in this 
respect. This friendship and that of Reagan and Thatcher no 
doubt smoothed the way for the sales of Polaris and 
Trident, respectively.
Why, then, did the Thatcher government resist extremely 
strong popular support for a dual-key for cruise? There are 
several answers to this. One is that it had the political 
will and ability to do so. As a strong government with a 
large majority facing a divided opposition, there could 
have been little doubt about its ability to prevail, 
particularly once the dissenting backbenchers had been put 
in their place. Beyond that, the other answers are all 
bound up with the special relationship.
The dual-key was probably not being offered by the 
Reagan administration. It is entirely possible that it was 
never really offered at all and that the issue of control 
was settled at Guadaloupe, with the subsequent 
deliberations by NATO committees merely rubber-stamping 
this decision. The Thatcher government would hardly have 
desired the Anglo-American discord and the domestic
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humiliation which would have resulted from asking for 
something which was not available.
Even if the dual-key had been available, asking for it 
would have created other problems at the same time that it 
would have quieted public concern over cruise. Having dual­
key for cruise would inevitably have led to even more 
questions about control over other American nuclear 
delivery systems based in the United Kingdom. It might have 
become the thin edge of the wedge, leading to more pressure 
for more control over the American systems and hence to 
increasingly strained relations with the United States. 
Further, if the United Kingdom had asked for dual-key, 
other NATO allies would have very likely done so too, and 
that would also have led to increasingly strained relations 
with the United States. Strained relations, arising from 
whatever source, were to be assiduously avoided at a time 
when the United Kingdom was in the process of buying 
Trident, its next generation deterrent, from the United 
States.
As for the parallel issue of control over the bases, it 
seems highly likely that the United Kingdom does not have 
an effective veto over their use. The United States could 
use those bases in a manner not congruent with the 
interests of the host nation. However, the Thatcher 
government was no doubt well aware that such an act by the 
Americans would be both unlikely and difficult to carry
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out. The special relationship is predicated on the belief 
that the two nations have highly congruent strategic 
interests. Hence, independent action by one nation to the 
detriment of the other has been a rare occurrence and this 
is likely to hold true for the immediate future. The 
presence of British personnel at Greenham Common, for 
instance, would make it difficult for the Americans to 
operate the cruise units if the British were ordered to 
prevent them from doing so. Finally, it seems that the 
Thatcher government, in adhering to the base use agreements 
as drawn up in 1952, was maintaining the continuity of 
British policy in favor of keeping an independent deterrent 
and relegating the issue of base use to second place.
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